17 January 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Managing the Improvement of Intelligence Analysis

The management goals of an intelligence analytic organization are twofold, answer the mail and improve the quality of analysis. The naval analog is that a ship is to meet current commitments and improve its combat readiness. The manager must always face the need to balance his efforts between such dual short- and long-term goals, a duality which creates a tension with a net strong pressure to concentrate on the immediate at the expense of the long term. Typically organizations go through maniac-depressive cycles in which long-term goals are neglected until a crisis situation forces a crash recovery effort. To establish the proper balance to avoid such cycles top managers must set up artificial mechanisms to increase the incentives of the organization to work on long-term goals all of the time.

For such a mechanism to work it must be based on an appreciation of two dimensions of the problem of improving analysis, the conceptual and the temporal. Conceptually one must understand the structural relations among symptoms, causes and curatives of intelligence problems. Temporally one must understand the interactions over time among discovering symptoms, identifying causes and applying curatives which in turn create new causes while mitigating old ones. Failure to appreciate one dimension of the problem can be debilitating; failure to appreciate both will wreak havoc.

In asking how to manage the improvement of intelligence analysis we must recognize that the problem is tough. In comparison the improvement of naval combat readiness is (conceptually) trivial. So we must be ready to grit our teeth and comb through the wool for awhile before we will have brushed out useful identifiable strands. When we are done with this combing the major threads which will emerge for management purposes will be:

- -The conceptual framework one uses to think about this management problem is important. If our mental models are wrong our actions will be wrong too.

- -Symptoms of intelligence problems will be categorized best in something we can call the "functions of intelligence."

- -Causes of intelligence problems will be categorized best in another taxonomy that reflects the organization of the intelligence community.

-Curatives will fit into the same taxonomy as causes, but will be further constrained because there are things that cause problems that can't be changed by a manager; he must learn to live with them.

-Everything is complicated by the existence within the community of very different cultures. Symptoms, causes and curatives are different among them. Imposing an unapplicable curative on a particular office or directorate can be as bad as failing to impose an appropriate one.

-Viewed over time managing the improvement of intelligence involves pursuing several different tracks in parallel, e.g. searching for new symptoms while implementing curatives in reaction to previously identified symptoms.

-There is no simple collection of solutions. Rather there are a host of curatives which if applied judiciously and consistently can in time significantly ameliorate many of the symptoms.

-The process is so complex that it cannot be sustained without formal feedback mechanisms even if it did not have to compete for management attention with answering the daily mail.

At the risk of seeming to insult your intellect, I am now going to address the conceptual dimension of managing the improvement of intelligence analysis beginning with a tedious rehearsal of well-known facts leaning heavily on the analogy of a physician's tasks. I do this to build a simple mental model to ensure we are agreed on what we are talking about and to help you, in situations like Face to Face or Congress, explain the conceptual problems to people who will be impatient for a simple solution.

A physician sees a complex human made up of chemical compounds, neurological systems, etc. arranged anatomically. A student of intelligence also sees a complex body with several parts, most simply described by the acronym CAD, Collection, Analysis and Dissemination. If he goes into each of these parts he finds further complexities.

Collection is the equivalent of the human senses of sight, hearing, touch and smell. It is made up of many disciplines the most important of which are described by the acronym HIS.

-Human Intelligence: What we learn from newspapers, travelers, emigres and spies.

-Imagery: What pictures taken by hand-held cameras, airplanes, satellites, etc. tell us.

-Signals Intelligence: What we learn from the way people use electromagnetic energy.

Analysis for the physician involves the functioning of the brain and for the student of intelligence it does too. It is made up of roughly four mutually supporting, but different, functions which can be captured in some catch-phrases:

-FACTS & FIGURES: Who's where? When does how much rain fall? How deep is the water? How big is it? How much does it cost?, etc.

-RECKONING & REPORTING: What happened yesterday or did nothing happen? What is the military capability of an assembly of men & machines? What is the productive capacity of this or that combination of mines, factories, roads and people? etc.

-PREDICTION & PROGNOSES: What will happen tomorrow or next year? What are the critical factors influencing developments? What are the key uncertainties? etc.

-WATCH & WARD: Among all the futures that might unfold which ones are both sufficiently likely and sufficiently important to the US to raise a warning flag?

Dissemination for the physician involves speech, expressions and motions. For the intelligence officer it involves packaging and delivering the encyclopedic results of the collectors' and analysts' work to serve a variety of customers:

-The President and his principal advisers.

-An array of government planners.

-Negotiators at their meetings.

-Military commanders in combat.

balancing their needs to know many things against their ability to absorb information. One changes the focus, frequency and form of intelligence information to try to serve each consumer of intelligence.

So far this treatment of the conceptual dimension of managing the improvement of intelligence analysis has only made simplistic and arbitrary definitions of the stages in the flow of intelligence from source to consumer and of the functions of intelligence. But this is useful for two reasons. One is to make clear that because the rest of the discourse will focus on analysis, it is ignoring a large part of the problem. Another is to set the stage for discussing the ideas of symptoms, causes and curatives of problems of intelligence analysis. The framework within which symptoms will usually be treated best is the functions of intelligence, described by catch-phrases above.

Symptoms rarely appear directly equated to causes. For the physician the symptom of blurred speech could arise from a brain tumor, a pinched neck nerve, etc. For the intelligence manager the fact that an important consumer received an unpleasant surprise could arise (within the analytic part of his organization) from having lost a critical report, from analyst ignorance of how to piece together evidence, from analyst misallocation of his time, etc. Only relatively infrequently will the physician or the intelligence manager see a symptom that directly equates to a cause so a major task for both specialists is relating symptoms to causes, i.e. diagnosis.

The framework within which causes are best treated is different than the one for treating symptoms. For the physician it is the anatomical breakdown of the human body. For the manager of intelligence analysis it is the organizational body of his agency, e.g. NFAC. To the extent a symptom of an "intelligence failure" can be ameliorated by his actions, it must arise from a cause to be found in one or more of:

-The people who make up the analytic organization.

-The conditions under which those people work.

-The support given them in the form of working spaces, information, tools, etc.

-The management mechanisms of the organization.

Otherwise the "failure" is beyond the control of the manager of intelligence analysis; this is not to say that no manager can influence it, but if he can, he is managing more than just analysis. In fact most symptoms arise from a number of causes, some within the collection operations, some within analysis, some within dissemination processes and some within the consumers themselves.

Having related symptoms to causes one then applies curatives in the hope of doing more good than harm. The physician deals in a multitude of palliatives, therapies and preventative measures. The intelligence manager deals in an equally complex system. However, it will be useful to oversimplify by classifying the areas to which curatives may be applied as shown in the table on the next page. Note that this table is not intended to be complete in every detail, rather it is to display the broad framework and some exemplary detail.

A TENTATIVE AND SIMPLIFIED CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
FOR CURATIVES, ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

I. People for Analysis
   A. Selection
      1. Recruiting Junior Analysts
      2. Recruiting Senior Analysts for Lateral Entry
      3. Firing
   B. Training
      1. Initial
      2. Ongoing
   C. Rewards and Incentives
      1. Promotion Policies
      2. Recognition
   D. Numbers of Analysts

II. Support of Analysis
   A. Support at the Collection-Analysis Interface
   B. Support of Analysis
      1. Environment
         a. Physical Surroundings
         b. Information Flow
         c. Intellectual Climate
      2. Analytic Techniques and Tools
   C. Support at Analysis-User Interface
      1. Editorial Functions
      2. Marketing Programs
      3. Presentational Means

III. Oversight of Analysis
   A. Monitoring
   B. Measurement
   C. Management
      1. Mechanisms for feedback and control
      2. Manager selection and training

At this point we have laid out, in considerable abstraction, a conceptual framework for thinking about the management of intelligence analysis. Hopefully this will help avoid falling into the common trap of confusing the management function with the substance of particular analyses. In any case one can conceive of a huge sheet of paper; down the left-hand margin are listed all the symptoms of intelligence analysis problems, down the center of the sheet are listed all the causes we have been able to identify with arrows drawn to the particular symptoms that revealed these causes, and down the right-hand margin are listed all the curatives we have undertaken or will undertake with arrows drawn to the causes that each curative will help. The next page is a small hypothetical excerpt from such a table.



When he has an approximation of this hypothetical huge piece of paper in some form, one can say that conceptually he grasps the management issues involved in improving intelligence analysis. Then he is ready to talk sensibly about how to make intelligence analysis better, that is to address the temporal dimension of the problem. Before doing so it is important to note that we are not talking about a big computer processed system, a slick-covered publication, or even necessarily a real "huge piece of paper"; one is talking about having a reasonably clear grasp of the structure of the problem. This is not an insurmountable task. In fact by the Fall of 1977 NFAC senior management had the problem conceptualized adequately. Since then the momentum of the process has been lost and the conceptualization has been largely dissipated. However, it could be rescued in fairly short order, say in a month or so.

In order to get better and to keep getting better one needs to march along five paths in parallel

-Push ongoing programs to get better.

-Get moving on a number of obvious programs that will help.

-Sort out remaining questions about what symptoms relate to what causes and what curatives will help.

-Look at what intelligence will be years in the future and map out how to prepare for it.

-Develop better measures of the quality of analysis.

Before discussing each path, it is worth observing that managing this requires a formal mechanism which serves as a monitor, a conscience and a prod. The mechanism needs to have several features.

-A responsible official.

-A description of the structure of relations among symptoms, causes and curatives.

-An explicit description of curatives and a process for evaluating if each is working.

-A regular feedback to management.

-An explicit program plan. (A five-year program for the Community had been sketched out by early 1978, but it died from "lack of transfer" when responsibility for this area shifted from DD/RM to DD/NFA. This corpse still remains the best prototype of what is needed here.)

For concreteness let's think of this mechanism as one guy who keeps the huge sheet of paper described earlier. When he hears a new complaint (symptom) he enters it in the left-hand column and gets somebody in management to tell him appropriate causes and curatives to be listed in the middle and right-hand columns. This fellow also keeps a shelf of notebooks, one for each of the tentative categorizations of curatives introduced earlier. Each curative action is represented on a sheet in one of these notebooks which shows, among other things, causes and symptoms to be ameliorated by this curative, milestones to be achieved in applying the curatives and the measures to be used to see if the curative is working. Our man also has a five-year program posted on his wall listing all curatives and showing the milestones associated with each. He spends his days playing with his three toys; checking his wall chart to see what milestones are coming up, leafing through his notebooks, making measurements on each curative as it approaches a milestone, and tracing out arrows on his huge sheet of paper to understand how his symptoms, causes and curatives interact. Once a week he gives senior managers a report which includes:

-A list of newly discovered symptoms (and who is assigned to trace out causes and propose curatives for these).

-Proposals to modify curatives based on their impacts.

-A status report showing those curatives which are working markedly better or worse than expected.

-Proposals as to where he should search for new symptoms.

He leaves these weekly report meetings with orders to relay to subordinate managers and guidance for his next week's work.

Without making too much of this picture, the point is that some such management mechanism is critical. Otherwise things will fall through cracks; symptoms will be noted and then forgotten, causes will remain unidentified, curatives will be misdirected or will peter out prematurely. Furthermore some such mechanism is needed to show outside critics that the DCI is in charge. The philosophy here is that if one shows that one clearly understands one's problems and has a reasonable (not necessarily all that reasonable either) plan to solve them, one will be left pretty much alone. On the other hand a public display of ignorance or indecision is like bleeding in shark infested waters.

If this management mechanism to improve intelligence is to work over a period of months and years it must cause us to proceed down the five paths in parallel. Tandem treatment would be nicer in some cases, but the sharks are not going to allow us this luxury. That we have not already been bitten badly is miraculous; such luck can't hold. Again the five paths are ongoing programs, new starts, resolving questions, futurology and measurement.

Ongoing programs are listed in several places; the 1977 Community response to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, NFAC's goals statement to the DDCI in the summer of 1978, the Community responses to DD/NFA's call for their programs (Fall 78), and DD/NFA's input to Mr. Aaron in December 1978 on political intelligence. These lists provide a start. What is now needed for each of these is:

-Layout milestones (e.g. on a five-year planning horizon) for each curative program so one knows what specifically is to happen by when, e.g. replace broad generalities like, "Work with State to place analysts abroad" with specifics like, "Place at least five analysts in Africa and South Asia by July 1979, ten by July 1980, etc."

-Sort out what really is being done to improve analysis rather than for other reasons, e.g. several computer-related programs reported to the SSCI as programs to improve the quality of analysis really were attempts to get better answers to specific problems which only coincidentally would add something to our knowledge of how to do better analysis in general.

-Establish ground rules for describing each program so that all programs in NFAC, and later perhaps in the Community, can at least be compared to see if

  -Things are falling between stools, e.g. if each office, NIO and agency were to list their consumers, I'll bet some important consumers would be unlisted.

  -We are inadvertently duplicating efforts, e.g. I'll bet that the duplication within NFAC and surely in the Community on contracted work is striking.

  -We are responding to the wrong criticisms, e.g. applying curatives in NFAC/OSR, OSI or OWI in response to 90% of the public criticism of intelligence would be inappropriate because those criticisms are symptomatic of root causes that exist only in NFAC/ORPA and State (and to a lesser extent in NFAC/OER).

-Define for each program some measures of success no matter how crude they may be. Unless such measures are argued out and used there will never be an adequate connection between our curatives and the causes of problems in intelligence. A classic case is the CIA's repeated bootless efforts in the audio-visual field; curatives pursued with no idea as to the causes to be corrected.

In addition to rationalizing and pushing ongoing programs there are a number of programs that we generally agree should be started, but little has been done to move ahead on them.* Among these (as of the Fall of 1977 in NFAC) were establishing career paths to supergrade levels for specialists in various geographic and substantive areas, defining the needs of various offices better for recruiting purposes, providing more formal and informal recognition of good analytic work, etc. I am not aware of any significant movement in several of these areas since; they seem to have fallen through a crack. So the matter of new starts in NFAC could begin again with the Fall 1977 list. Other agencies, or indeed NFAC, could quickly repeat the process which produced that list to provide new starting points. They could qualitatively lay out symptoms, causes and curatives and achieve a consensus on a few curatives that should be started promptly. No need to worry that they're not "optimal." If senior and middle management agree it's useful, get cracking. Of course as these new starts occur they need to be treated as described above for ongoing programs.

The third path is to resolve questions which still exist about the relations among symptoms, causes and curatives. These are more than moot because on the answers to these questions depend judgments about the efficacy of many proposed curatives. As noted earlier one objective is to ensure that we are not responding in one part of the intelligence community to a symptom that on careful examination will be seen to apply to another part. Pursuing this path does not involve major computer simulations or studies with scores of analysts writing appendices to reports and annexes to the appendices. Rather it involves revisiting each of the curatives listed on the attached foldout sheet with a small

*This and several subsequent statements are based on the results of an informal survey I did in 1977. I dug through files, talked to people in and out of intelligence. Then I listed all the problems that any apparently sane person had claimed existed, these were a mixture of symptoms and causes because I hadn't clearly sorted out which was which. I then made another list of all the curatives I had seen or heard proposed. I asked all NIOs and Office Directors (OD) to review and comment on these lists. I then made a big table the rows of which corresponded to various proposed curatives, the columns of which corresponded to an NIO or OD, and each cell contained a comment on a particular curative by a particular NIO or OD. Studying this table showed that curatives fell into four classes, those which had substantial support (it is these I mean when I talk of new starts), those which were generally opposed, those which were controversial in that expert opinion was pretty evenly divided, and finally (largely because I had not formulated my questions well) those on which no overall view was apparent. It is these last three groups that need further study before deciding what to do with them. For information the final summary table of this exercise is attached showing how I classified curatives in late 1977.

group of knowledgeable people to qualitatively study how it relates to causes and symptoms, what promise it holds for alleviating known problems and what costs it will incur both in dollars and in creating new problems. When the results of a dozen or so such working groups are collected after about a month managers will be in a position to accept some curatives and reject others; they'll still be left with some that require further study. Indeed one task of the overall management mechanism is to ensure that this process continues indefinitely. Whenever someone, not clearly a lunatic, claims to have found a new symptom, a new problem or a new curative, it deserves serious consideration by an ad hoc group and then by the senior managers of intelligence analysis.

The fourth parallel path is futurology. It is clear that an analytic organization whether it is in business or government has so much inertia that unless the manager can anticipate the future by his recruiting, training and other actions, he will always have a tiger by the tail. Therefore a part of the management mechanism should be to ensure that periodically, say biannually, we carefully ask questions like the following: In what environment will we work in five years, in ten years? What demands might be placed on intelligence? What capabilities might be available? What constraints now exist that seem most binding in terms of inhibiting evolution to meet reasonably possible new demands or use new capabilities? What actions should be taken now to prepare for likely futures and to hedge against particularly significant unlikely futures? Answering such questions is an open-ended process, but the management mechanism should codify the process of seeking answers. For example our one man staff can schedule a futurology review every two years on his wall chart, then ensure that somebody competent does it, and then feed the results of the examination into his overall management system.

The fifth path to be followed is to define measures of the quality of intelligence analysis. This task will be big initially and then will become a relatively small part of the process as the limits of what can be done are reached, rather quickly.

The task will be big initially because so little has been done to articulate what it is that constitutes good intelligence analysis. With few exceptions, analysts have perceived that they are subjected to capricious standards. They often use the phrase attributed to Kissinger, "I'll know what I like when I see it," to express their bitterness. The concentration of management attempts to improve analysis on reviewing work rather than on proselytizing analysts has exacerbated frustrations and made the lack of measures of the quality of intelligence analysis a major roadblock. The technique of criticism works well with small numbers of highly motivated students; it's disastrous when applied naked to a bureaucracy of hundreds of analysts who think they've already earned their spurs.

Clearly we need to admit that quality in intelligence analysis is fundamentally an aesthetic judgment. But we cannot let this be an excuse for doing nothing; neither should we hoist ourselves on our own yardstick just for the sake of having some formula or code that looks scientific. We will never have an explicit quantitative measure of analytical quality, but we can and must have explicit qualitative statements of our aesthetic criteria. Then we at least will be talking the same language; now we are in a tower of Babel. The process of making such explicit statements must start at once. Producing the first statement will be agony. It will be greeted with hoots and howls if we're lucky, or just quiet determined distain if we're unlucky. In any event in the process of disciplining top management to adhere to what it promulgated and analysts to observe the same guidelines, several major flaws will be revealed. Correcting these will be painful. Thereafter the changes likely will be only marginal and the main effort along this path will be to prevent backsliding.

Having read all of the above (and believed it) a reasonable question to ask is, "What do you recommend I do?" The answer must be in two parts, management and motivation.

Management actions should start the system described here, or a reasonable facsimile of it. The critical parts to be started at once are:

-Prepare and promulgate an explicit statement of criteria for good intelligence analysis. (Doing this is a 1-2 week full-time task.)

-Make the worksheets for each ongoing and generally-agreed-upon-but-not-yet-implemented program describing specific milestones, measures of achievement, etc. described earlier. (Laying out the guidelines for such worksheets will take 1-2 days; making up the worksheets for NFAC programs will take about a month.)

-Resolve remaining questions about proposed curatives which are not generally agreed. (This first cut should take about a month.)

-Prepare a comprehensive picture (the "huge" sheet referred to before) of the relations between symptoms, causes and curatives. (This will take about a month after the preceding steps are completed if they're done properly.)

-Make somebody clearly responsible for improving the quality of intelligence analysis. (Nominations will be provided if desired.)

-Do the other things recommended in the preceding paragraphs afterward. (They are not as urgent as the "top five.")

Motivation actions are much less clear, but are no less important. The one management action that is necessary to motivation is the promulgation of an explicit statement of criteria for good analysis, but it is not sufficient. Other actions are clearly required, but I admit to much less clarity on the overall picture here than in the management area. Peoples' self-esteem, enthusiasm and sense of direction must be revived in some cases, and merely nurtured in others, while carrying out changes that can only be interpreted as a statement that what has been done in the past was not satisfactory especially in the area of policy-related, especially political, analysis.

In that light the following actions seem to be necessary parts of the process.

-Careful explanations of the promulgated criteria in a spirit of, "You have done well, but the needs have changed so that we must adapt."

-Sympathetic searching out of and listening for symptoms of problems among the troops. Most of the symptoms at which we have looked up to now come from outside the organization.

-Care to avoid insulting the troops. This will involve saying on many occasions something to the effect of, "I'm accepting this because it's a good piece of work, but in the future I want you to modify your presentations in such and such a way."

-Care to avoid perturbing the troops. Changing analysis will be traumatic at best. One should be chary of compounding the problem by changing personnel management policies, shifting office spaces or taking other actions which will affect people's sense of security. Indeed one needs to actively work to squelch rumors and assure people of personal stability.

-Seek diligently for opportunities to praise or, failing to find these, for opportunities to show concern for the people's well-being.

-Recognize that, no matter what is done to motivate people, turning the tide will take months at best.

Attachment

	SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT OVERALL FAVORABLE	CONTROVERSIAL	LITTLE SUPPORT OVERALL UNFAVORABLE	NO OVERALL VIEW APPARENT	RELEVANT INFORMATIONS VIEWS FROM MEETINGS
I. People for Analysis	Better defining needs of various offices(review on board assets,examine relevancy of various indicators & evaluate sources)Provide better support of recruiters (on campus interviews, expose pros. candidate)				
IA. Selection 1. Recruiting Junior Analysts					
2. Lateral Entry for Senior Analysts			Improve methods of searching for lateral entrants		
3. Firing/Other					
IB. Training 1. Initial Trg.	Improve training in how to find info and in basic principles of analysis (e.g. building logical models, consistency rules, peculiarities of intell work.,etc.)		Provide basic language training to new analysts who lack a defined minimum level of expertise.		Training is seen as being "on the Job" by seniors and as not occurring by juniors.
2. Ongoing Trg.	Develop area specialist program.		Write a textbook on how to intelligence analysis		"our task forces are very ad hocish--we need management attention to get them to work as inter-disciplinary teams.
3. Other			Conduct a formal program to familiarize senior people with DCI&DNFAC ideas on what's good analysis		
IC. Rewards & Incentives 1. Promotion	Establish & Publicize Career paths to GS-18 for all specialties				PMCD is seen as a millstone around our necks
	Define"super analyst" jobs using PMCD tools				
2. Recognition	Implement system to increase formal and informal recognition of good work.		Use a periodical pub. to show & critique good analyses	Increase analysts interaction with DCI, D/DCI/NI via lunches & dinners	
3. Other				DCI consciously use prerequisites to build stature of analysts	
ID. Numbers 1.	Get more analysts			Trade off managers, administrators & collectors to get more analysts	The overwhelming concern in meetings was the perceived lack of analysts relative to demands to process raw data, answer the mail & do research. Talk of anything but how to get more ana is idle chatter.
2.					
IE. Culture 1.	Use multi-disciplinary seminars(esp. involving DCI, D/DCI/NI) to build intellectual		Prepare a "code of conduct" for intell. analysis		In meetings we seemed a once unable to say how to train analysts & asking for better guidance as to what our work should be.
2.					
II. Support of Analysis					
A. Support at Collection Analysis Interface		Reduce amount of compartmentation		improve support at the collection-analyst inter face, e.g.by force feeding data base deficiencies into the collection requirements	
1.			Establish an analysts' ombudsman at the collection-analysis interface		
IIB. Support of Analysis 1. Environment a. Physical Surroundings	Improve privacy and basic working aids				
b. Information Flow		Push SAFE		Improve libraries and data bases of the intell. community	
c. Intellect. Climate				Develop mechanism to nurture appropriate competitive analyses and ensure that no gaps are inadvertently left.	
2. Analytic Techniques				Improve the use of analytic techniques by providing for rapid responses to analysts' needs, searching for analyses in which techniques can help and searching for better methods of analysis.	
IIC. Support at Analysis User Interface 1. Marketing Programs		Proceed in an organized fashion to see what would be useful before producing a major estimate. Have consumers participate in an orderly review of NFAC plans for data base building		Identify consumer groups&for each evaluate the value of various sources of intell. compare presentational means define timeliness demands,etc.	We are out selling when we can't keep up with the current demand.
2. Presentation Means				Make better use of video recorders	
3. Other					
III. Oversight of Analysis A. Monitoring 1. Administrative			Establish a central system to monitor effort in current intell. vs. long term research judge our efforts against priorities, examine our time-liness and balance efforts across the various forms of intell.and facilitate work load sharing.		
2. Analytic Review	Establish an analytic review board made up of people who understand analysis, that is closely compled to production&which is responsible to work with analysts to do better.				Junior analysts see the processes that go on after writing a paper as stifling. Originality wasting time and taking forever.
B. Measuring 1.			Establish a system to regularly evaluate the accuracy of our predictions		We need to know what our people are doing
2.			Define standards of scholarship for intell. analysis. Subject NFAC analyses to outside "hostile" review. Use seminar programs and senior review panel to review analyses.		
C. Management 1.					There is no single culture in NFAC. Therefore, undue centralization of detailed imple-mentation is to be avoided
2.					